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Abstract
This paper clariÞes and extends previous work on the equivalence between monetary
regimes and Þscal regimes involving social security systems. We consider equivalence
across regimes, showing that monetary regimes are equivalent to one or both of two alter-
native types of social security regimes. Two implications emerge. One is that Þnanciing a
real expenditure by increasing the inßation rate is equivalent, across regimes, to Þnancing
the expenditure by increasing the tax rate on social security beneÞts. In addition, our
results imply that a wide range of monetary policy actions are equivalent, across regimes,
to Þscal policy actions that change the scale of the social security system and the tax
rates on social security beneÞts and/or bank deposits.
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1 Introduction
Inßation imposes a tax that generates revenue for the government. The public Þnance ap-
proach to monetary/macroeconomic theory uses this fact as a starting point for its analysis
of monetary policy. This approach is grounded on explicit consideration of a uniÞed gov-
ernment budget constraint that includes revenue from the inßation tax, revenue from direct
taxes, and revenue absorbed or produced by the government debt. With government pur-
chases constant, monetary policy actions that alter the rate and/or the base of the inßation
tax must be accompanied by changes in Þscal policy instruments. In general, more than one
type of Þscal policy adjustment will be possible, and the eﬀects of a given change in monetary
policy may depend critically on the particular type of adjustment that occurs.
The public Þnance approach has been frequently used to address a recurring question in
monetary theory: Are monetary policy changes irrelevant? If so, in what sense are they ir-
relevant? Often, irrelevance is used in the sense that monetary policy actions have no eﬀects
on real allocations and/or relative prices. In view of the public Þnance aspects, monetary-
policy irrelevance occurs when the eﬀects of changes in monetary policy instruments are
exactly oﬀset by the eﬀects of the changes in Þscal policy instruments that bring the govern-
ment budget back into balance. The seminal contribution to this branch of the literature
on monetary policy irrelevance is Wallace (1981), which describes conditions under which
central bank purchases or sales of private assets (open market operations) have no eﬀects on
either real allocations or the price level. Other important contributions include Chamley and
Polemarchakis (1984), Peled (1985) and Sargent and Smith (1987). In this literature, each
contributor begins with a description of a monetary regime with a Þscal component and goes
on to investigate whether changes in monetary policy within that regime can be irrelevant.1
In this paper, we take the monetary-irrelevance literature a step further. We investigate
whether a monetary regime can itself be irrelevant, in the sense that any allocation supported
by such a regime can also be supported by a Þscal regime that does not include Þat money or
other unbacked government liabilities.2 When this is the case, we can think of the two types
of regimes as being equivalent to each other. For this reason, we use the term equivalence,
rather than irrelevance, to characterize our results.3
1 In the realm of Þscal policy, within-regime equivalence results have a history that dates back to Ricardo,
and, in modern times, to Barro (1974).
2 There is also a literature that asks whether the allocations supported by particular monetary policy regimes
can be supported by monetary policy regimes of a diﬀerent type. Examples include Mourmouras and Russell
(1992) and Bacchetta and Caminal (1994).
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The cross-regime equivalence results we obtain in this paper are potentially important
for at least two reasons. First, they may improve our understanding of the role of money
and monetary arrangements by identifying Þscal arrangements that can play the same role.
Second, cross-regime equivalence means that changes in monetary policy are equivalent to
changes in Þscal policy. So we may be able to use Þscal policy analysis to help us understand
the results of monetary policy experiments. Even further, we may be even be able to use
models of Þscal policy to draw inferences about the results of monetary policy experiments
without adding monetary features to the models.4
Our analysis builds on previous research on the role of money in overlapping generations
(OLG) models. The work of pioneers such as Samuelson (1959), Shell (1971), and Wallace
(1980) demonstrated that in OLG models, Þat currency and other unbacked government lia-
bilities may have value because they allow agents to conduct intergenerational exchanges they
could not arrange without assistance from the government.5 These authors also recognized
that the eﬀects of these exchanges are very similar to the eﬀects of class of Þscal policies that
the model is well suited to study  pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security systems, in which
lump-sum taxes on young agents Þnance transfers to old agents.
More recent work has succeeded in constructing two sides of a rigorous theoretical triangle
linking social security, unbacked government debt, and Þat currency. The Þrst side of the
triangle is developed in McCandless and Wallace (1993). They show that any real allocation
supportable by a social security system can be supported by a government policy regime
involving unbacked government bonds and transfer payments Þnanced by revenue from bond
The process of constructing the equivalence results that were cited in the preceding paragraph has been
summarized by Sargent (1987, p. 304), as follows: One starts by assuming that government and private
securities exist and are valued in an initial equilibrium, with a given speciÞcation of government policy
strategies. Holding the consumption allocations associated with this initial equilibrium Þxed, one solves the
equilibrium conditions for the class of government policies that supports this same allocation in equilibrium.
Our procedure is analogous, but diﬀerent. We choose a speciÞcation of government policy strategies that is
completely diﬀerent from the initial speciÞcation  a speciÞcation that features Þscal policy strategies rather
than monetary policy strategies. Then we look for a single government policy, within this new policy-strategy
speciÞcation, that supports the initial allocation in equilibrium.
4 For example, Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987), in the introduction to their well-known analysis of Þscal policy,
comment that There is only one type of government debt in this model and no money. Hence, the question
of inßation and the distortions caused by the interaction of real and nominal magnitudes cannot be addressed.
... Introducing money into the model in a satisfactory way would constitute an enormous task. (page 12).
Our results indicate that it may be possible to use the Auerbach-Kotlikoﬀ model to study the eﬀects of certain
monetary policy experiments without adding monetary features to the model.
5 For our purposes, government debt is said to be unbacked if it is not accompanied by a stream of future
surpluses in the governments budget, net of interest and currency seigniorage, of equal present value. In
some cases, unbacked debt is serviced out of future currency seigniorage revenues; in others, it is rolled over
forever.
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sales. Sargent (1987) develops the second side of the triangle, establishing that exchanges of
unbacked bonds for Þat currency, or vice-versa (open market operations), are irrelevant  a
result which implies that monetary regimes with Þat currency are equivalent to regimes with
unbacked government debt.6 In both cases, the analytical framework is a pure exchange
OLG model in which money yields the same real return as competing stores of value. We
provide the last side of this triangle, using a version of the same model to prove explicitly (in
Theorem 1, and Corollary 1) that any allocation supported by a monetary regime with Þat
currency and/or unbacked government debt can be supported as a Þscal regime with PAYG
social security, and vice-versa.
In addition, we extend this literature, asking whether this equivalence result can hold
in OLG models in which money is return-dominated. We pose this question in a setup in
which money is valued only if the government imposes legal restrictions on intertemporal
trade. This is the same type of question Sargent and Smith (1987) asked and answered
about the within-regimes equivalence result obtained by Wallace (1981). Previous work
relevant to this question includes Romer (1985), who asserts, without providing a formal
proof, that any real allocation supported by a monetary regime involving Þat currency and
reserve requirements can also be supported by a regime involving government bonds backed
partly, but not completely, by direct taxes on the returns on bank deposits. The formal
proof is provided by Bacchetta and Caminal (1994), who also extend Romers analysis to
situations in which the government is earning revenue from currency seigniorage.7 ,8 To our
knowledge, however, there has never been any work on the relationship between monetary
regimes with reserve requirements or other legal restrictions and purely Þscal regimes with
social security systems but no monetary features.
6 As the terms monetary and Þscal are conventionally deÞned, policies involving government debt are
Þscal policies rather than monetary policies. In OLG models, however, Þat currency and unbacked government
bonds are so closely related that it does not seem reasonable to distinguish between the two types of policies
in this way. In the literature on the interaction between Þscal and monetary policy, for example, Þscal policy
is said to be held constant, with respect to changes in monetary policy, as long as the levels of direct taxes,
transfers, and government purchases are held Þxed, even if there are changes in the stock of unbacked debt.
Changes of the latter type are sometimes described as representing passive actions by the budgetary authority
(the Treasury), perfectly anticipated by the central bank, that reconcile the central banks decisions with the
tax and spending decisions of the Þscal authority (the legislature). For this reason, we will deÞne policies
involving unbacked debt as monetary rather than Þscal.
7 In closely related work, Mourmouras and Russell (1992) use a model with linear stochastic storage to show
that monetary equilibria with reserve requirements and seigniorage can be supported as monetary equilibria
with seigniorage, but no reserve requirements, plus taxes on deposit returns.
8 We show in Section 3.2 of this paper that any allocation supported by a currency reserve requirement and
unbacked government debt can be supported by a larger currency reserve requirement with no government
debt.
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The principal result of our analysis is that any allocation supported by a monetary regime
with Þat currency, reserve requirements, and currency seigniorage, possibly in combination
with unbacked government debt and bond seigniorage, can also be supported by a Þscal
regime with PAYG social security plus taxes on social security beneÞts and/or deposit returns.
We present two versions of this result, featuring social security schemes of two diﬀerent types.
The Þrst version features a social security scheme in which young households contributions
are Þnanced by a proportional tax on their saving. These contributions are used to pay
beneÞts, to old agents, that are proportional to the contributions they made when they were
young. The government may tax these beneÞts in order to Þnance a real expenditure. Under
this scheme, the pre-tax beneÞts paid by the social security system are Þnanced entirely by
current social security contributions, and the pre-tax return rate on these contributions is
equal to the population growth rate. The second version of the result features a lump-
sum social security system. Under this system, however, the pre-tax return rate on social
security contributions is higher than the population growth rate, and the government imposes
a proportional tax on bank deposits to help Þnance the social security beneÞts.9 ,10
Our results shed light on a long-standing question in monetary economics: How is the
inßation tax similar to direct taxes? We show that monetary equilibria in which the mone-
tary policy imposes an inßation tax are equivalent to social security equilibria in which the
government levies a proportional tax on social security beneÞts. This equivalence holds
whether or not Þat money is dominated in rate of return (which, in our model, is whether
or not the government uses binding reserve requirements to create or augment the demand
for Þat money). The precise relationship between the value of the inßation rate under the
monetary regime and the value of the tax rate on social security beneÞts under the equivalent
Þscal regime depends partly on the nature of the monetary regime. In Proposition 1, we de-
scribe these two regimes as either one in which the reserve requirement is not binding, or one
in which unbacked government debt is excluded and the reserve requirement is binding. In
Proposition 2, we show that a monetary equilibrium with Þat currency, reserve requirements
and government debt is equivalent to a mixed equilibrium with unbacked government debt
9 This version of the equivalence result is inspired by, and can be viewed as an extension of, Romer (1985)
and Bacchetta and Caminal (1994).
10Although our discussion of these results focuses on the ability of social security regimes to support monetary
equilibria, we prove the results in both directions: that is, we also show that social security equilibria can be
supported as monetary equilibria. In some cases, these equivalent monetary equilibria require supplementary
lump-sum taxes on the old (but not the young) households. In addition, although our discussion focuses on
steady states, we prove our results for equilibria of all types.
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and a saving-based social security system, but no Þat currency or reserve requirements. For
all pairs of monetary and Þscal regimes listed, an increase in the inßation rate to Þnance a
larger real expenditure has exactly the same impact as an increase in the tax rate on social
security beneÞts.
In this paper, we demonstrate that monetary policy actions  changes in the money
growth rate, open market operations or changes in the reserve ratio  are equivalent, across
regimes, to changes in Þscal policy. These Þscal policy changes may include changes in
the scale of the social security system (that is, changes in the level of social security taxes
and beneÞts), and changes in the tax rates on social security beneÞts or returns on bank
deposits. Thus, we can use Þscal policy analysis, which is relatively well understood, to help
us understand the real eﬀects of monetary policy actions. In addition, we can use the real
eﬀects of Þscal policy actions to predict the real eﬀects of monetary policy actions in the
equivalent monetary regimes. This result opens the door to using models of Þscal policy to
study the real eﬀects of monetary policy, even when the models in question do not have any
monetary features.
We can illustrate the potential usefulness of our analysis by using it to provide some
non-monetary intuition about one of the best-known results in the theory of overlapping
generations models with money: Freemans (1987) optimal reserve requirements theorem.
Freeman studies an economy in which households save by depositing funds at Þnancial inter-
mediaries whose assets consist of physical investments (stored goods) and required reserves
of Þat currency. The government imposes the reserve requirement in order to Þnance a real
purchase via currency seigniorage. Freeman shows that the optimal choice for the reserve
ratio is the lowest ratio feasible  a ratio that produces a hyperinßation.
In Freemans model, we show that a monetary equilibrium with reserve requirements
is equivalent to a Þscal equilibrium with a pay-as-you-go social security system. In the
monetary equilibrium, there is a government purchase Þnanced by an inßation tax; in the
Þscal equilibrium, this purchase is Þnanced by a direct tax on social security beneÞts. We can
use this equivalent Þscal equilibrium to describe the Þscal logic behind Freemans result. It
begins with the fact that pay-as-you go social security provides intergenerational transfers at
a pre-tax return rate equal to the population growth rate, while physical investment, under
Freemans assumptions, oﬀers a higher return rate. Thus, social security is an ineﬃcient
system for reallocating resources from young to old households, and the best social security
system is the smallest one that allows the government to raise the required revenue by taxing
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the beneÞts. Under this optimal system, the beneÞts tax rate is 100 percent: the beneÞts, and
the contributions that Þnance them, are just large enough to Þnance the government purchase.
Since there are no after-tax beneÞts, there are no ineﬃcient intergenerational transfers. The
monetary analogue of this system is a reserve requirements regime in which the gross return
rate on reserves is zero, so that the reserves are conÞscated by the government and provide
no return to the banks or their depositors. The government conÞscates the reserves by
engineering a hyperinßation. Each period, the intermediaries buy all their currency reserves
from the government, paying exactly the quantity of goods the government needs to Þnance
its purchase. Next period, the hyperinßation has rendered the existing currency stock
worthless, so the intermediaries who purchase currency reserves must again buy all of them
from the government.
In the next section of the paper, we lay out the model we will use for our analysis. In
Section 3, we use two alternative speciÞcations of this model to obtain the equivalence results
described earlier in this introduction. In Section 4, we provide two additional examples that
are intended to illustrate further some of the ways in which our results can help us understand
and predict the eﬀects of changes in monetary policy. Section 5 concludes the paper.11
2 The model
2.1 Basics
The model we employ is a standard two-period overlapping generations model. Time is
discrete and inÞnite in one direction, beginning at date 1 and continuing at dates 2, 3, ... .
At date 1 there are N0 > 0 agents, the members of generation 0 (the initial old), who live for
a single period. At each date t ≥ 1 a generation of two-period lived agents is born; they live
and consume, etc. at dates t and t+ 1. There are Nt members of this generation t, with
Nt = nNt−1, where n > 0, for t ≥ 1. There is a single consumption good that is (possibly)
storable using a linear technology: If kt > 0 units of the good are placed in storage at date
t then xkt units are recovered at date t+ 1, where x ≥ 0.12
Each member of each generation t ≥ 1 has identical preferences over consumption bundles
(c1t, c2,t+1), measured in units of the consumption good. These preferences are assumed to
be representable by a utility function u(c1, c2) with standard features. The agents come
11The proofs of the equivalence results appear in Appendix A. The details of the Þrst example from Section
4 are presented in Appendix B.
12Our results are readily generalized to economies with nonlinear storage, or with neoclassical production and
capital.
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in two varieties: fraction α ∈ (0, 1] belong to Variety A and the rest belong to Variety B.
Variety A agents are endowed with ωA1 units of the consumption good when young (at date
t) and ωA2 units of the good at date t+ 1, with ω
A
1 > 0 and ω
A
2 ≥ 0. For Variety B agents,
ωB1 ≥ 0 and ωB2 > 0. Given the agents preferences, the two sets of endowment patterns
are assumed to have the property that Variety A agents are savers at any return patterns
consistent with equilibrium, while Variety B agents are borrowers at those return patterns.
Each initial old agent is endowed with ω2 > 0 units of the consumption good and with
h0 > 0 units of Þat currency. (There is only one variety.) These agents prefer more
consumption to less during their single period of life.
2.2 Assets and intermediation
All transactions involving assets are intermediated through zero-cost, competitive banks.
Variety B agents borrow by issuing consumption-loan liabilities to these banks and Variety
A agents save by holding the banks deposit liabilities. We denote the values deposited
or borrowed sjt , j = A,B, where s
A
t will be positive (saving/depositing) and s
B
t will be
negative (borrowing). The potential assets of the banks are consumption loans, stored
goods, government bonds, and Þat currency. The markets for all these assets are perfectly
competitive. The gross real rate of return on consumption loans extended at date t is
denoted Rt. The goods price of a unit of Þat currency at date t is denoted pt. If Þat
currency is valued, so that pt > 0 for all t ≥ 1, then its gross real return rate from date t to
date t+ 1 is Rmt ≡ pt+1/pt ≡ 1/Πt, where Πt is the gross inßation rate from date t to date
t+1. For simplicity, if Þat currency is not valued then we set Rmt = 0. Government bonds
are one-period consumption bonds; their gross real rate of return is Rbt .
Without loss of generality, we assume that the banks hold the same portfolio on behalf
of each Variety A agent born at a given date. The quantity of goods stored on behalf of a
Variety A agent at date t is denoted kAt . The real present value of the bonds held for each
of these agents is denoted bAt , and the real balances of Þat currency held for each agent is
mAt = pt h
A
t , where h
A
t represents the nominal balances.
2.3 Asset return rates
Competition between banks, who may store goods deposited, ensures that
Rt = x if storage occurs (if kAt > 0), and
Rt ≥ x otherwise. (1)
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Similarly,
Rbt = ρ
d
t if government bonds are held (if b
A
t > 0), and
Rbt ≤ ρdt otherwise, (2)
where
ρdt = (1− ϕt+1)Rt . (3)
and ϕt+1 ≥ 0 is the tax the government imposes, at date t + 1, on the returns on private
assets  consumption loans or stored goods  acquired by the banks at date t. (See below.)
For Þat currency, we have
Rmt ≤ ρdt , (4)
but real balances of Þat currency can be positive when Rmt < ρ
d
t . This possibility grows out
of our assumption that the government imposes a currency reserve requirement of λt ∈ [0, 1]
on banks that accept deposits at date t. Here λt is the minimum fraction of the banks total
deposits that must be held in the form of Þat currency. In equilibria in which money is not
valued we assume λt = 0 for all t ≥ 0.
Competition between banks ensures that the after-tax gross real deposit return rate Rdt
satisÞes
Rdt = (1− λt) ρdt + λtRmt . (5)
If Rmt < ρ
d
t then the reserve requirement is binding and banks hold Þat currency only to
satisfy the reserve requirement.
2.4 Taxes
The government may administer as many as two diﬀerent tax systems: a lump sum tax
system that helps Þnance government purchases (with an exception noted below) and a pay-
as-you-go social security system.
2.4.1 Social security
The pay-as-you-go social security system may have as many as two diﬀerent components: a
lump-sum component and a saving-based component.
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Lump-sum social security Under the lump-sum component of the social security system,
at each date t ≥ 1 each young agent from Variety A pays a lump-sum social security tax
of τA1t ≥ 0. At each date t ≥ 2 each old Variety A agent receives a pre-tax social security
beneÞt of TA2t ≤ 0, while at date 1 each old agent receives a pre-tax beneÞt of T21 ≤ 0. The
corresponding after-tax beneÞts are
τA2t = (1− zt)TA2t and
τ21 = (1− z1)T21, (6)
where zt is the proportional tax rate on social security beneÞts of either type.
The lumpsum social security system may also include a proportional tax of ϕt+1 ≥ 0 on
the gross returns at date t + 1 on private assets acquired by the banks at date t. We will
refer to this tax, somewhat misleadingly, as a deposit tax.
Saving-based social security Under the saving-based component of the social security
system, young Variety A agents must pay social security taxes equal to a fraction γt ≥ 0 of
their gross saving sAt . That is, Ψ
A
1t = γt s
A
t , where Ψ
A
1t represents an agents saving-based
social security contribution. Old agents from Variety A receive saving-based social security
beneÞts that they view as proportional to their contributions. Thus,
ΨA2,t+1 = −υt+1ΨA1t , (7)
where υt+1 is the after-tax social security replacement rate  the fraction of a young agents
saving-based contributions at date t that is returned to it, at date t+1, in the form of social
security beneÞts. The pre-tax social security beneÞts paid at any date t ≥ 1 are denoted
ΦA2t for t ≥ 2 and Φ21 for date 1. We have
ΨA2t = (1− zt)ΦA2t for t ≥ 2, and
Ψ21 = (1− z1)Φ21 . (8)
2.4.2 Other taxes and tax totals
The government may impose additional lump sum taxes on agents of either or both varieties,
and/or on the initial old, in order to Þnance government purchases and/or to supplement the
consumption of the initial old. The taxes imposed on young and old members of generations
t ≥ 1 will be denoted txi1t and txi2,t+1, i = A,B. The tax or transfer imposed on the initial
old agents will be denoted tx21
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The total lump-sum taxes or transfers imposed on members of generations t ≥ 1 during
their lives are denoted Ti1t and T
i
2,t+1, i = A,B. We have
TA1t = τ
A
1t + tx
A
1t
TA2,t+1 = τ
A
2,t+1 + tx
A
2,t+1 (9)
and
TB1t = tx
B
1t
TB2,t+1 = tx
B
2,t+1 (10)
In addition,
T21 = τ
A
21 + tx21. (11)
Net-of-tax social security taxes or transfers excepted, the total taxes or transfers collected
from the members of generations t ≥ 1 during their lives are denoted ti1t and ti2,t+1, i = A,B.
We have
tA1t = tx
A
1t and
tB1t = tx
B
1t ; (12)
tA2t = tx
A
2t − zt
¡
TA2t +Φ
A
2t
¢
and
tB2t = tx
B
2t for dates t ≥ 2, (13)
and
t21 = tx21 − z1 (T21 +Φ21) , (14)
where t21 denotes the analogous tax variable for the initial old.
2.5 Government budget constraint
The government must Þnance a real purchase of g ≥ 0 per young agent at each date t ≥ 1.
Abstracting from the social security system, the governments consolidated budget constraint
at dates t ≥ 2 is
g = pt (ht − ht−1
n
) + (bt −
Rbt−1 bt−1
n
) + α
·
tA1t +
tA2t
n
+
¸
+ (1− α)
·
tB1t +
tB2t
n
¸
. (15)
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The variables ht and bt represent the average nominal quantity of money and the average
real present value of the bonds, respectively, issued (supplied) by the government per young
agent at date t. At date 1, the governments consolidated budget constraint is
g = α
·
tA11 +
tA21
n
+ p1 (h1 − h0
n
) + b1
¸
. (16)
We assume that each component of social security system is Þnanced (separately) in an
actuarially balanced fashion. Government purchases are Þnanced by currency and bond
seigniorage, by lump-sum taxes that are not part of the social security system, and by taxes
on social security beneÞts. Thus, we can break up the government budget constraints as
follows:
g = pt (ht − ht−1
n
) + (bt −
Rbt−1 bt−1
n
) (17)
+α
·µ
txA1t +
txA2t
n
¶
+
zt T
A
2t
n
¸
+ (1− α)
µ
txB1t +
txB2t
n
¶
(18)
0 = τA1t +
TA2t
n
+
ϕtRt−1 kAt−1
n
(19)
0 = ΨA1t +
ΦA2t
n
(20)
for dates t ≥ 2 and
g = p1
µ
h1 − h0
n
¶
+ b1 + α txA11 + (1− α) txB11 +
tx21
n
+
z1 T21
n
(21)
0 = ατA11 +
T21
n
(22)
0 = αΨA11 +
Φ21
n
(23)
for date 1.
2.6 Household budget constraints
The budget constraints of a two-period-lived agent belonging to Variety A are
cA1t + s
A
t = ω
A
1 −TA1t (24)
cA2,t+1 =
¡
ωA2 −TA2,t+1
¢
+Rst s
A
t (25)
where it is assumed that sAt is optimally chosen to be positive, given the option to switch to
the Variety B constraints by choosing st < 0. Here Rst represents the gross return rate on
(positive) saving; it is given by
Rst = (1− γt)Rdt + γt υt+1 . (26)
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The Variety B budget constraints are
cB1t + s
B
t = ω
B
1 −TB1t (27)
cB2,t+1 =
¡
ωB2 −TB2,t+1
¢
+Rt s
B
t (28)
where it is assumed that sBt is optimally chosen to be negative, given the option to switch to
the Variety A constraints by choosing st > 0. The agents intertemporal budget constraints
are consequently
cA1t +
cA2,t+1
Rst
=
¡
ωA1t −TA1t
¢
+
ωA2,t+1 −TA2,t+1
Rst
(29)
cB1t +
cB2,t+1
Rt
=
¡
ωB1t −TB1t
¢
+
¡
ωB2,t+1 −TB2,t+1
¢
Rt
. (30)
The budget constraints of the initial old agents are
c21 = (ω2 − tx21 − τ21 −Ψ21) + p1h0 . (31)
2.7 Competitive equilibrium
2.7.1 Conditions
Credit market clearing requires
α
¡
sA1t − µAt
¢
+ (1− α) sB1t = αkAt , (32)
where µAt ≡ mAt +bAt denotes the total real present value of holdings of government liabilities
per Variety A agent. In a non-monetary equilibrium we must have mAt = 0 for all t ≥ 1. In
a monetary equilibrium the currency market must clear, which requires
αhAt = ht . (33)
In a monetary equilibrium with a binding reserve requirement (with Rmt < Rt), we must have
mAt = λt s
A
t . (34)
This condition follows from the fact that if Rmt < Rt, then banks will hold Þat currency only
to satisfy a reserve requirement. In other monetary equilibria we must have
mAt ≥ λt sAt . (35)
If there are government bonds outstanding then we must have
bt = α b
A
t , (36)
so that the bonds supplied by the government are demanded by the agents.
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2.7.2 Definitions
We will study competitive equilibria of two general types: non-monetary equilibria and mon-
etary equilibria.
Non-monetary equilibria In a non-monetary equilibrium we must have λt = pt = 0 for
all t ≥ 1. A non-monetary equilibrium then consists of sequences of positive return rates
{Rt}∞t=1, {Rbt}∞t=1, {ρdt }∞t=1, {Rdt }∞t=1, and {Rst}∞t=1, tax levels {tx21, {txA1t,txA2,t+1}∞t=1, {txB1t,txB2,t+1}∞t=1}
and {T21, {τA1t,TA2,t+1}∞t=1}, non-negative tax rates {ϕt+1}∞t=1, {zt}∞t=1 and {γt}∞t=1, non-negative
social security replacement rates {υt+1}∞t=1, bank storage choices {kAt }∞t=1 and agent con-
sumption choices {c21, {cA1t, cA2,t+1}∞t=1, {cB1t, cB2,t+1}∞t=1} that satisfy return conditions (1)-(2),
(4)-(5), and (25), tax conditions (6)-(14), government budget constraints (9) and (20)-(22)
and market-clearing condition (31), where the consumption choices maximize agents utility
subject to the budget constraints (28)-(30).
Monetary equilibria We will study monetary equilibria with and without binding re-
serve requirements. For simplicity, we will view a monetary equilibrium without binding
reserve requirements as one in which the reserve requirement is zero. Such an equilibrium is
characterized by λt = 0 for all t ≥ 1, positive currency price and return sequences {pt}∞t=1
and {Rmt }∞t=1, positive nominal currency supply and demand sequences {ht}∞t=1 and {hAt }∞t=1,
respectively, positive real present value bond supply and demand sequences {bt}∞t=1 and
{bAt }∞t=1, respectively, conditions (3), (32) and (35) met with equality and condition (34)
met with inequality at each date t ≥ 1, and the sequences and conditions described in the
preceding paragraph. A monetary equilibrium with reserve requirements is similar except
that λt > 0 for all t ≥ 1, condition (3) is met with inequality, and condition (33) replaces
condition (34).
3 Equivalence results
3.1 No reserve requirements, lump-sum social security
In this subsection, we study economies in which x = 0, so that storage does not occur
(pure exchange economies). We conÞne ourselves to studying monetary equilibria in which
there are no reserve requirements, so that the real rate of return on currency is equal to the
real return rate on other assets. We show that any monetary equilibrium of this type can
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be supported as a non-monetary equilibrium featuring a lump-sum social security system
without deposit taxes, and vice-versa.
Theorem 1 Suppose the government policy features no reserve requirements, no taxation of
deposits, and no social security system or other taxes/transfers of any kind. Suppose there
is a monetary equilibrium with interest rate sequence {R∗t }∞t=1, real fiat currency balances
sequence {mA∗t }∞t=1, real government bond holdings sequence {bA∗t }∞t=1, initial tax t∗21 and
consumption allocation {c∗21, {(cA∗1t , cA∗2,t+1), (cB∗1t , cB∗2,t+1)}∞t=1}. Then the equilibrium interest
rate sequence and consumption allocation can be supported as a lump-sum social security
equilibrium, with no deposit taxes and no other taxes or transfers, in which bmAt = bbAt = 0,bτA1t = µA∗t , bzt = 1− R∗t−1
n
µA∗t−1
µA∗t
(37)
for t ≥ 2, and
bz1 = 1− p∗1h0n − tx∗21n
αµA∗1
.
Equation (36) implies that for dates t ≥ 2 we have"
n
µA∗t
µA∗t−1
−R∗t−1
#
µA∗t−1 = bzt ³−bTA2t´ . (38)
Here R∗t−1 is the rate of return on currency (and, in this economy, all other assets) from
date t − 1 to date t. On the left-hand side of this equation, we may think of the term in
square brackets as the inßation tax rate on real balances of currency (and, in this economy,
government bonds) acquired at date t − 1 by the members of the generation born at that
date; the remaining term is the value of those balances. In a steady state, the Þrst term
would simplify to n−R∗t−1 or, equivalently, to n− 1/Π∗t−1, where Π∗t−1 is the gross inßation
rate from date t − 1 to date t. On the right-hand side of the equation, the Þrst term is
tax rate on the social security beneÞts received by the members of generation t− 1 and the
second term is the value of those beneÞts.
Corollary 1 Suppose the government policy involves no currency or bonds, and no taxes
or transfers except for a lump-sum social security policy. Suppose this policy supports
an equilibrium with interest rate sequence {R∗t }∞t=1 and social security taxes {τA∗1t }∞t=1, so-
cial security benefits tax rates z∗t for t ≥ 1, and consumption allocation {c∗20, {(cA∗1t , cA∗2,t+1),
(cB∗1t , cB∗2,t+1)}∞t=1}. Then the equilibrium interest rate sequence and consumption allocation
can be supported as a currency-only monetary equilibrium, with no social security system, in
which bmAt = τA∗1t , with supplementary taxes or transfers btA2,t+1 = − [n (1− zt+1)−R∗t ] bmAt
for t ≥ 1.
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3.2 Reserve requirements
In this subsection, we study economies in which x ≥ 0 and storage may (or may not) occur.
We conÞne ourselves to studying monetary equilibria in which a reserve requirement is binding
at each date. We show that any equilibrium of this type can be supported by a non-monetary
equilibrium with a saving-based social security system, and vice versa. We also show that any
monetary equilibrium with binding reserve requirements can be supported by a non-monetary
equilibrium featuring a lump-sum social security system with a deposit tax. In addition, we
show that any monetary equilibrium with reserve requirements and government bonds can be
supported by a monetary equilibrium with reserve requirements but no government bonds,
or by a monetary equilibrium with government bonds, but no currency, and a saving-based
social security system.
3.2.1 Saving-based social security
Theorem 2 Suppose the government policy features positive reserve requirements at each
date (λ∗t > 0 for all t ≥ 1) and no social security system or any other taxes or transfers,
except at date 1. Suppose there is a monetary equilibrium in which the reserve requirements
are binding at each date, with real return rate sequence {R∗t }∞t=1, real fiat currency balances
sequence {mA∗t }∞t=1, real government bond holdings sequence {bA∗t }∞t=1, date 1 tax t∗21 and
consumption allocation {c∗21, {(cA∗1t , cA∗2,t+1), (cB∗1t , cB∗2,t+1)}∞t=1}. Then the equilibrium interest
rate sequence and consumption allocation can be supported as a saving-based social security
equilibrium in which bmt = bbt = 0, bγt = µA∗t /sA∗t ,
bzt = 1− Rµ∗t−1
n
µA∗t−1
µA∗t
(39)
for t ≥ 2, where
Rµ∗t−1 ≡
Rb∗t−1 bA∗t +Rm∗t mA∗t
µA∗t−1
(40)
and
z1 = 1− p
∗
1 h0
αnmA∗1
. (41)
In this case, we can write"
n
µA∗t
µA∗t−1
−Rµ∗t−1
#
µA∗t−1 = bzt ³−bTA2t´ . (42)
Here Rµ∗t−1 is the average gross real rate of return on government liabilities, weighted by the
real holdings of these liabilities. It is also the gross real rate of return on currency  the
inverse of the gross inßation rate  in an equivalent monetary equilibrium with government
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currency but no government bonds  see Proposition 1 below. Thus, we may think of the
term in square brackets as the inßation tax rate in that equivalent equilibrium, while the
second term on the left-hand-side is the inßation tax base in that equilibrium.
As this discussion indicates, an implication of Theorem 2 is that we can support the
currency-and-bonds equilibrium featuring reserve ratios λ∗t and currency return rates Rm∗t as
a currency-only equilibrium featuring reserve ratios eλt = µA∗t /sA∗t .and currency return rateeRmt = Rµ∗t .13 This result has independent importance, so we will state it and prove it as
Proposition 1 Suppose the government policy features positive reserve requirements at each
date (λ∗t > 0 for all t ≥ 1) and no social security system or any other taxes or transfers, except
at date 1. Suppose there is a monetary equilibrium in which the reserve requirements are
binding at each date, with real return rate sequences {R∗t }∞t=1 and {Rd∗t }∞t=1, real fiat currency
balances sequence {mA∗t }∞t=1, real government bond holdings sequence {bA∗t }∞t=1, date 1 tax
t∗21 and consumption allocation {c∗21, {(cA∗1t , cA∗2,t+1), (cB∗1t , cB∗2,t+1)}∞t=1}. Then the equilibrium
interest rate sequences and consumption allocation can be supported as a monetary equilibrium
with currency and reserve requirements but no government bonds. The equilibrium reserve
requirements sequence is eλt = µA∗t /sA∗t and the equilibrium sequence of real currency return
rates is eRmt = Rµ∗t ≡ R∗t bA∗t +Rm∗t mA∗tµA∗t . (43)
Proposition 1 implies that the results of any monetary policy experiment conducted under
a regime featuring currency reserve requirements and unbacked government bonds, can be
duplicated, across regimes, by an experiment in a regime of the same type without the
unbacked debt.
As we have seen, when a monetary policy regime includes both currency and bonds, the
implicit tax rate from the monetary equilibrium that corresponds to the explicit tax rate
from the equivalent social security equilibrium (the tax rate on social security beneÞts) is
the average return rate on both types of government liabilities. This return rate is diﬀerent
from (and higher than) the real return rate on the governments currency liabilities, which
is the rate that determines the inßation tax rate. One alternative way to characterize
the relationship between an inßation tax and a tax on social security beneÞts involves an
equivalence result that is very closely related to Theorem 2. This result, which we will
call Proposition 2, establishes that any monetary equilibrium with government currency,
13Note that in the previous economy, where there were no binding reserve requirements, we could replace the
bonds with currency, or vice-versa, rather trivially, since both had the same real rate of return. This is an
example of the irrelevance of open market operations in economies of this type: see Sargent (1987, ch. 7)
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government debt and binding currency reserve requirements can be supported by a quasi-
Þscal equilibrium with unbacked government debt and a saving-based social security system,
but no reserve requirements and no government currency.14 And the inßation tax rate in
the monetary equilibrium is equal to the direct tax rate on social security beneÞts in this
quasi-Þscal equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Suppose the government policy features positive reserve requirements at each
date (λt > 0 for all t ≥ 1) and no social security system or other taxes or transfers of any kind,
except at date 1. Suppose there is a monetary equilibrium in which the reserve requirements
are binding at each date, with interest rate sequences {R∗t }∞t=1 and {Rd∗t }∞t=1, real fiat currency
balances sequence {mA∗t }∞t=1, real government bond holdings sequence {bAt }∞t=1, date 1 tax
t∗21 and consumption allocation {c∗21, {(cA∗1t , cA∗2,t+1), (cB∗1t , cB∗2,t+1)}∞t=1}. Then the equilibrium
interest rate sequence and consumption allocation can be supported as an equilibrium with no
government currency, but government bonds and a saving-based social security system. This
equilibrium features bbAt = bA∗t , bγt = µA∗t /sA∗t ,
bzt = 1− Rm∗t−1
n
mA∗t−1
mA∗t
, (44)
for t ≥ 2 and bz1 = 1− p∗1 h0
αnmA∗1
. (45)
(The proof of this proposition will be omitted, since the required modiÞcations in the proof
of Theorem 2 are quite trivial.)
We conclude this section by demonstrating that Theorem 1 works in the opposite direc-
tion, so that the two types of regimes, monetary and Þscal, really are entirely equivalent. We
show, that is, that any equilibrium under a Þscal regime with a saving-based social security
system can be supported as an equilibrium under a monetary regime with binding currency
reserve requirements. There is one caveat; the social security policy cannot be so generous
that its implicit return rate exceeds the return rate on privately-issued liabilities. Otherwise,
the reserve requirement will not be binding.
Corollary 2 (to Theorem 2) Suppose the government policy features no currency or gov-
ernment bonds and no taxes or transfers except for a saving-based social security system
with a sequence of social security contribution tax rates {γ∗t}∞t=1 and a sequence of social
security benefits tax rates {z∗t }∞t=1. Suppose there are associated equilibrium interest rate
sequences {R∗t }∞t=0 and {Rs∗t }∞t=0 and an associated equilibrium consumption allocation {c∗21,
14We refer to this equilibrium as quasi-Þscal because (1) it meets our special-purpose deÞnition of a monetary
equilibrium, which encompasses equilibria in which the only government liability is debt, but (2) it would be
regarded by most economists as a purely Þscal equilibrium, because it does not include any government
currency.
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{(cA∗1t , cA∗2,t+1), (cB∗1t , cB∗2,t+1)}∞t=1}. Finally, suppose this equilibrium satisfies Rs∗t < R∗t for
all t ≥ 1. Then the equilibrium interest rate sequence and consumption allocation can be
supported by a monetary equilibrium in which the government imposes reserve requirementsbλt = γ∗t .
3.2.2 Lump-sum social security with deposit taxes
Theorem 3 Suppose the government policy features positive reserve requirements at each
date (λ∗t > 0 for all t ≥ 1) and no social security system or other taxes or transfers of
any kind, except at date 1. Suppose there is a monetary equilibrium in which the reserve
requirements are binding at each date, with interest rate sequences {R∗t }∞t=1 and {Rd∗t }∞t=1, real
fiat currency balances sequence {mA∗t }∞t=1, real government bond holdings sequence {bA∗t }∞t=1,
date 1 tax t∗21 and consumption allocation {c∗21, {(cA∗1t , cA∗2,t+1), (cB∗1t , cB∗2,t+1)}∞t=1}. Then the
equilibrium interest rate and consumption allocation can be supported by a lump-sum social
security system involving taxes and transfers bτA1t = µA∗t and bτA∗2,t+1 = −Rd∗t bτA1t for t ≥ 1, andbT21 = −αnbτA11, deposit taxes at rates bϕt+1 solving (1− bϕt+1)R∗t = Rd∗t for t ≥ 1, and social
security benefits tax rates
bzt = 1− Rµ∗t−1 µA∗t−1
nµA∗t
(46)
for t ≥ 2 and bz1 = 1− p∗1h0 − tx∗21
αnµA∗1
. (47)
In this case, unlike the previous ones, we cannot obtain this result in the other direction:
that is, we cannot show that any equilibrium featuring a lump-sum social security system
partly supported by a deposit tax can be duplicated by a monetary equilibrium with reserve
requirements but no deposit taxes. The reason for this is that most social security systems
of this sort will not produce equilibria in which the after-tax rate of return on deposits is
equal to the implicit rate of return on social security contributions.
The analogue of Proposition 2 holds for this type of social security regime: if the ini-
tial monetary equilibrium features currency, a currency reserve requirement, and unbacked
bonds, then it can be duplicated by a monetary-Þscal equilibrium involving a lump-sum social
security policy, a deposit tax, and unbacked bonds. And it is again true that the inßation
tax rate in the purely monetary equilibrium is equal to the direct tax rate on social security
beneÞts, adjusted for the population growth rate, in this equivalent monetary-Þscal equilib-
rium. Since this proposition and proof are very similar to their analogues in Bacchetta and
Caminal (1994), we do not present them here.
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4 Examples
In this section, we describe two examples that help illustrate our results. The Þrst example
is parametric and numerical. The details of this example  functional forms, parameter
values, equilibrium values of endogenous variables, etc.  are presented in Appendix B. The
other example is conceptual in nature.
Example 1 involves a pure exchange economy with intragenerational diversity, so that each
generation t ≥ 1 consists of both Variety A and Variety B households (savers and borrowers).
We begin by describing a steady state under a monetary policy regime with Þat currency,
binding reserve requirements, and government debt. The government Þnances a real purchase
through a combination of currency seigniorage and bond seigniorage. Wallace (1984) studied
economies and equilibria of this type. The monetary and Þscal policy experiments we conduct
in this example are based on the monetary policy experiments Wallace studied. We follow
him by structuring the model so that the initial steady state features a real interest rate
higher than the population growth rate. As a result, the government loses revenue from
bond seigniorage, so its inßation tax revenue must be large enough both to cover these losses
and to Þnance its real purchase.
We begin our equivalence analysis of this example by describing a money-only policy
regime (no government debt) that supports the same equilibrium consumption allocation as
the money-and-bonds regime just described. Compared to the money-and-bonds regime,
the money-only regime features both a higher reserve ratio and a higher real currency return
rate. In particular, the real currency return rate in the money-only steady state lies between
the real currency return rate in the steady state under the mixed regime and the real bond
return rate in that steady state.
Next, we describe two Þscal policy regimes that also support the same consumption
allocation, despite the absence of currency or bonds. One of these regimes features a saving-
based social security system, while the other features a lump-sum social security system
supplemented by taxes on deposit returns. In each case, the total value of the social security
contributions in the steady state under the Þscal policy regime is equal to the total real value
of the stock of government liabilities (currency and bonds, or just currency) in the steady
state under the monetary policy regime. And in each case, the rate at which social security
beneÞts are taxed under the Þscal policy regime is equal to the inßation tax rate in the
money-only monetary policy regime.
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We continue this example by returning to the initial money-and-bonds equilibrium and
conducting a policy experiment of the type described by Wallace (1984). We hold the reserve
ratio Þxed and imagine an open market sale that increases the ratio of bonds to currency,
comparing the steady states under the old and new ratios. One result of this experiment
that has attracted a good deal of attention is that the real bond rate and the real currency
return rate change in opposite directions. Thus, the experiment produces a form of the
unpleasant monetarist arithmetic described by Sargent and Wallace (1981): a tighter
monetary policy  a policy that involves more bonds and less currency, and that produces a
higher real interest rate  leads to higher inßation rather than lower inßation.15
As before, our next step is to construct the money-only regime that supports the post-
experiment consumption allocation from money-and-bonds regime. When we compare this
new money-only regime to the money-only regime that supported the pre-experiment alloca-
tion, we Þnd that the new regime has a higher reserve ratio. The new regime also features
a higher real currency return rate  that is, a lower inßation rate  than the old money-
only regime. Thus, the unpleasant-arithmetic result described in the preceding paragraph
is revealed to be an artifact of the division of the real stock of government liabilities into
two components with diﬀerent real return rates. In an equivalent experiment without this
division, the monetarist arithmetic is pleasant.16 With the division, however, as the
increase in the total stock of government liabilities crowds out private debt and drives the
real interest rate upward, it also drives up the (equal) real interest rate on government bonds,
forcing the real rate of return on currency to fall (and the inßation rate to rise) even though
the average real return rate on government liabilities rises.
Next, we construct a savings-based social security regime that supports the same con-
sumption allocation as the post-experiment monetary policy regimes.17 Social security
contributions and beneÞts are higher than they were under the social security policy that
supported the pre-experiment allocation, but the tax rate on the social security beneÞts is
lower. Thus, our monetary policy experiment is revealed to be equivalent to Þscal policy
experiment that involves increasing the scale of a pay-as-you-go social security system. This
15See Bhattacharya, Huybens and Smith (1998), Bhattacharya and Kudoh, (2001) and Espinosa and Russell
(1998, 2001).
16The equivalent experiment is an increase in the reserve ratio rather than an open market purchase. But a
reserve ratio increase is generally considered to be a form of monetary tightening. Note that under Wallaces
assumptions, which we follow, the total real stock of currency is Þxed, so that an open market sale (an increase
in the bonds-money ratio) always increases the total real stock of government liabilities.
17For the sake of completeness, we also describe the lump-sum social security policy, supplemented by deposit
taxes, that supports the post-experiment steady state.
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revelation helps illustrate the logic behind both types of experiments. In each case, a pol-
icy intervention increases the scale of governments intergenerational transfer system. The
increased intergenerational transfers crowd out private lending and drive up the real interest
rate. However, the fact that the transfers are larger allows the government to reduce the
rate at which it taxes them without losing any revenue.
Example 2 involves a recent result by Bhattacharya and Haslag (2001) about the optimal
rate of inßation. Their analytical framework is the reserve-requirements-with-storage model
studied by Freeman (1987). They use this model to determine whether it may be optimal
for a government that cannot change the required reserve ratio to use the inßation tax as
source of revenue, even when the alternative revenue source is tax is a lump-sum tax on young
households. Somewhat surprisingly, they Þnd that in most cases some use of the inßation
tax is optimal.
How can a distorting tax be superior to a non-distorting one? The answer lies in two
of the results we have obtained in this paper. First, a monetary regime with a reserve
requirement is equivalent to a Þscal regime with a pay-as-you-go social security system  a
system which, as we have seen, is a bad one in Freemans model. Second, the inßation tax
is equivalent, across these two regimes, to a proportional tax on social security beneÞts.
Suppose that, under the monetary regime, the government increases the inßation rate and
uses the additional currency seigniorage revenue to reduce the lump-sum tax on the young
households. Across regimes, the increase in the inßation rate is exactly equivalent to an
increase in the tax rate on social security beneÞts, and, thus, to a reduction in the size of the
after-tax beneÞts. This reduction in the after-tax social security beneÞts Þnances a decrease
in the lump-sum tax on the young households that is almost equivalent to a decrease in
their social security contributions.18 Thus, the equivalent (almost) policy has the eﬀect of
reducing the scale of the equivalent (almost) social security system. And since social security
is welfare-reducing in this economy, it should be no surprise that increasing the inßation rate
may be welfare-increasing. Indeed, the only reason greater reliance on the inßation tax does
not always increase welfare is that taxing social security beneÞts at a higher rate increases
the return distortion associated with the fact that the equivalent social security system is
saving-based rather than lump-sum.19
18The analogy is not quite precise, since the social security contributions are saving-based rather than lump-
sum.
19If the alternative to a lump-sum tax on the young households was a lump-sum tax on the old households,
rather than seigniorage, then increasing the tax on the old households would unambiguously increase steady-
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5 Concluding remarks
Policy equivalence results have a long and important history in macroeconomics. In this
paper, we extend the policy equivalence literature by studying equivalence between mone-
tary regimes and Þscal regimes. In particular, we show that any allocation that can be
supported by a monetary regime with Þat currency and/or unbacked government debt can
also be supported by a Þscal regime with a pay-as-you-go social security system. We ob-
tain this result in two diﬀerent types of economies: pure exchange economies in which Þat
currency and other government or private liabilities have the same equilibrium return rates,
and investment/storage economies in which Þat currency is return-dominated and is held to
satisfy reserve requirements.
Although our Þndings have a number of potentially important implications, we think two
of these implications stand out. First, one of the key roles of monetary arrangements and
monetary policy actions may be to determine the nature and scale of the intergenerational
transfers that take place in the economy. The inßation tax, for example, may be best
understood as a tax on intergenerational transfers. Second, we may be able to understand
the eﬀects of changes in monetary policy more completely by studying the eﬀects of equivalent
changes in Þscal policy, and we may be able to use models of Þscal policy to predict the eﬀects
of changes in monetary policy. Our results suggest, for example, that if Þscal policy actions
involving changes in the social security system can have large, permanent real eﬀects  as
many economists believe  then monetary policy actions can also have large, permanent real
eﬀects.
Our Þndings have another possible implication that deserves mention. Many developing
countries do not have social security systems or have systems that are very limited in scope.
Many of these same countries have great diﬃculty collecting taxes and/or administering pro-
grams Þnanced by tax revenue. But some of them have relatively well-developed monetary
systems, and their governments may have many years experience enforcing currency reserve
requirements and other monetary and Þnancial restrictions. Our results indicate that coun-
tries in this situation that are considering creating new social security systems, or expanding
existing ones, might be able to accomplish their goals more eﬀectively using their existing
monetary and Þnancial institutions.
state welfare.
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Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 1: In a social security equilibrium, the household budget constraints
are
cA1t +
cA2,t+1bRt = (ω1 − bτA1t) + ω2,t+1 − bτ
A
2,t+1bRt
cB1t +
cB2,t+1bRt = ω1 + ω2,t+1bRt .
By hypothesis, bτA1t = µA∗t and bτA2,t+1 = (1− zt+1) bTA2,t+1, where we assume bTA2,t+1 = −nbτA1,t+1
and bzt+1 = 1− R∗t µA∗t
nµA∗t+1
.
Thus,
bτA1t + bτA2,t+1bRt = µA∗t −
nµA∗t+1
R∗t µA∗t
nµA∗t+1bRt = µA∗t − R
∗
tbRt µA∗t .
Suppose bRt = R∗t for t ≥ 1. Then we have
bτA1t + bτA2,t+1bRt = 0 ,
so the members of generation t face the same combined budget constraints in the social secu-
rity equilibrium. It follows that they will make the same consumption choices: (bcj1t,bcj2,t+1) =
(cj∗1t , c
j∗
2,t+1) for j = A,B and t ≥ 1.
In a social security equilibrium, the credit market clearing condition is
α
h³
ωA1 − bτA1t´− bcA1ti+ (1− α) ¡ωB1 − bcB1t¢ = αbkt,
By hypothesis, bτA1t = µA∗t ,
and we have just assumed bcj1t = cj∗1t for j = A,B and t ≥ 1. So this is
α
£¡
ωA1 − µA∗1t
¢− cA∗1t ¤+ (1− α) ¡ωB1 − cB∗1t ¢ = αbkt .
So if we further assume bkAt = kA∗t then we have
α
¡
ωA1 − cA∗1t
¢
+ (1− α) ¡ωB1 − cB∗1t ¢ = α ¡µA∗1t + kA∗1t ¢ .
which is the credit market clearing condition from the monetary equilibrium.
Under the social security equilibrium, the government budget constraint at dates t ≥ 2,
net of social security, is
g = α
bzt bτA2t
n
.
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We have seen that this can be rewritten
g = α
³
1− R∗t−1 µA∗t−1
nµA∗t
´
nµA∗1t
n
= α
µ
µA∗t −
R∗t−1
n
µA∗t−1
¶
,
which is the government budget constraint in the monetary equilibrium.
Under the social security system, the members of generation zero consume
bc21 = ω2 − bτ 21
and the government budget constraint is
g =
bz1 bT21
n
.
We also have bτ21 ≡ (1− bz1) bT21 and bT21 = −αnbτA11. We know by hypothesis that bτA11 = µA∗1
and that bz1 = 1− p∗1h0n − tx∗21n
αµA∗1
.
So bτ21 = −(1− bz1)αnbτA11 = − p∗1h0n − tx∗21nαµA∗1 αnµA∗1 = tx∗21 − p∗1h0 .
Thus, we have bc21 = ω2 − tx∗21 + p∗1 h0
which is the budget constraint of the initial old households in the monetary equilibrium. In
addition, we have
g =
³
1− p∗1h0−t∗21
αnµA∗1
´ ¡−αnµA∗1 ¢
n
= αµA∗1 −
p∗1h0 − tx∗21
n
which is the government budget constraint, at date 1, in the monetary equilibrium. ¤
Proof of Corollary 1: In the monetary equilibrium with supplementary taxes or transfersbt2,t+1 = − £n (1− z∗t+1)−R∗t ¤ bmA∗1t , the intertemporal budget constraints of the members of
generations t ≥ 1 are
cA1t +
cA2,t+1
Rt
= ωA1 +
ωA2,t+1 +
£
n (1− z∗t+1)−R∗t
¤
τA∗1tbRt
cB1t +
cB2,t+1bRt = ωB1 + ω
B
2,t+1bRt .
If bRt = R∗t , then these constraints become
cA1t +
cA2,t+1
Rt
=
¡
ωA1 − τA∗1t
¢
+
ωA2,t+1 − τA∗2.t+1bRt
cB1t +
cB2,t+1bRt = ωB1 + ω
B
2,t+1bRt .
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which are the household budget constraints from the social security equilibrium. So house-
holds will choose bcji,t+i−1 = cj∗i,t+i−1, j = A,B, i = 1, 2. It follows that if bkt = k∗t , which we
will assume, then the Variety A households will choose bmAt = ωA1 − cA∗1t − k∗t = τA∗1t .
In the monetary equilibrium, the credit market clearing condition is α
³
ωA1 − bcA1t − bkt´+
(1− α) ¡ωB1 − bcB1t¢ = α bmAt . But since bcA1t = cA∗1t , bcB1t = cB∗1t , bmAt = τA∗1t and bkt = k∗t , this is
equivalent to
α
¡
ωA1 − τA∗1t − cA∗1t − k∗t
¢
= (1− α) ¡ωB1 − cB∗1t ¢ ,
which is the credit market clearing condition from the social security equilibrium, and thus
holds by hypothesis.
In the monetary equilibrium, the government budget constraint for dates t ≥ 2 is
α
bτA2t
n
+ α
Ãbmt − bRt−1
n
bmt−1! = gt .
This constraint is equivalent to
−α
£
n (1− zt)−R∗t−1
¤
τA∗1t
n
+ α
µ
τA∗1t −
R∗t−1
n
τA∗1,t−1
¶
= gt .
This constraint reduces to
α z∗t τ
A∗
1t = gt
or, given that TA∗2t = n τA∗1t ,
α
z∗t TA∗2t
n
= gt
which is the governments net-of social-security budget constraint in the social security equi-
librium.
At date 1, in the monetary equilibrium, we must have
bc21 = ω21 + bp1h0
and
g1 = α bmA1 − bp1h0n .
We have seen that bmA1 = τA∗11 . Suppose we choose bp1 so that
bp1h0 = −τ ∗21.
Then we have bc21 = c∗21. In addition, the government budget constraint can be rewritten
g1 = α τ
A∗
11 +
τ∗21
n
.
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And since we have T∗21 = −αn τ∗11 and τ∗21 = (1− z∗1)T∗21, this becomes
g1 = −z
∗
1 T
∗
21
n
,
which is the government budget constraint, at date 1, in the social security equilibrium. ¤
Proof of Theorem 2: In the saving-based social security equilibrium, the budget con-
straints facing households are
cA1t +
cA2,t+1bRst = ωA1t +
ωA2,t+1bRst
cB1t +
cB2,t+1bRt = ωB1t + ω
B
2,t+1bRt
Suppose Rt = R∗t . Then
bRst ≡ (1− bγt) bRt + γt bυt+1 = (1− γt)R∗t + bγt n (1− bzt+1) µA∗t+1µA∗t
= (1− bγt)R∗t + bγt n Rµ∗tn µA∗tµA∗t+1 µ
A∗
t+1
µA∗t
= (1− bγt) bRt + bγtRµ∗t .
Given our choice for bγt, this becomes
bRst = (1− µA∗tsA∗t )R∗t + µ
A∗
t
sA∗t
Rµ∗t
= (1− µ
A∗
t
sA∗t
)R∗t +
x bA∗t +Rm∗t mA∗t
sA∗t
= (1− m
A∗
t
sA∗t
)R∗t +
mA∗t
sA∗t
Rm∗t
= (1− λt)R∗t + λtRm∗t = Rd∗t ,
since m∗t = λt s∗t . It follows that households face the same budget constraints in the
social security equilibrium, which means they will make the same consumption choices:
(bcj1t,bcj2,t+1) = (cj∗1t , cj∗2,t+1) for j = A,B and t ≥ 1. It also follows that bsjt = sj∗t .
In the saving-based social security equilibrium, the credit market clearing condition is
α
h
(1− γt)bsAt − bkti+ (1− α) bsBt = 0
where bsjt = ωj1t − bcj1t, j = A,B . Since bγt = µA∗t /sA∗t , this becomes
α
·
(1− µ
∗
t
s∗t
) bst − bkt¸+ (1− α) bsBt = 0⇔ α hbsAt − bkAt − µA∗t i+ (1− α) bsBt = 0
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Since bsjt = sj∗t , j = A,B, if bkAt = kA∗t then this condition is equivalent to
α
£
s∗At − kA∗t − µA∗t
¤
+ (1− α) sB∗t = 0
which is the credit market clearing condition from the monetary equilibrium.
In the saving-based social security equilibrium, the government budget constraint is
g = α bzt bγt bst .
Now
bzt bγt bst =
Ã
1− R
µ∗
t−1
n
µA∗t−1
µA∗t
!
µA∗t
sA∗t
sA∗t = µ
A∗
t −
Rµ∗t−1
n
µA∗t−1
=
¡
mA∗t + b
A∗
t
¢− 1
n
¡
R∗t b
A∗
t +R
m∗
t m
A∗
t
¢
=
µ
mA∗t −
Rm∗t−1
n
mA∗t−1
¶
−
µ
bA∗t −
R∗t
n
bA∗t−1
¶
So the social security constraint is equivalent to
g = α
·µ
bA∗t −
R∗t
n
bA∗t−1
¶
+
µ
mA∗t −
Rm∗t−1
n
mA∗t−1
¶¸
,
which is the government budget constraint in the monetary equilibrium.
At date 1, in the social security equilibrium, we have
bc21 = ω21 − bΦ21 ,
where bΦ21 = (1− bz1) bΨ21 and bΨ21 = −αnbγ1 bsA1 . We also have
g = −α bz1 bΨ21
n
.
We have seen that bγ1 bsA1 = λ∗1 sA∗1 = mA∗1 , and we have
bz1 = 1− p∗1 h0
αnmA∗1
.
It follows that bΦ21 = −p∗1 h0 ,
giving us bc21 = c∗21. In addition, we have
g =
µ
1− p
∗
1 h0
αnmA∗1
¶
αmA∗1 = αm
A∗
1 −
p∗1 h0
n
,
which is the government budget constraint, at date 1, in the monetary equilibrium. ¤
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Proof of Proposition 1: In the monetary equilibrium with no bonds, the budget con-
straints facing households are
cA1t +
cA2,t+1eRdt = ωA1t +
ωA2,t+1eRdt
cB1t +
cB2,t+1eRt = ωB1t + ω
B
2,t+1eRt .
The deposit rate eRdt is eRdt = (1− eλt) eRt + eλt eRmt .
Suppose eRt = R∗t . Given our choices of eλt and eRmt , we have
eRdt = (1− µA∗tsA∗t )R∗t + µ
A∗
t
sA∗t
x bA∗t +Rm∗t mA∗t
µA∗t
= (1− m
A∗
t
sA∗t
)R∗t +
mA∗t
sA∗t
Rm∗t
= (1− λ∗t )R∗t + λ∗t Rm∗t = Rd∗t .
So both groups of households will make the same consumption and saving choices. Note that
we must have emAt = eλt sA∗t = µA∗t and ekAt = esAt − emAt = sA∗t − µA∗t = kA∗t . Since eRt = R∗t
implies esBt = sB∗t , it follows that the credit market clearing constraint continues to hold.
In the monetary equilibrium with no bonds, the government budget constraint for dates
t ≥ 2 is
gt = α
ÃemAt − eRmt−1 emt−1n
!
.
We have emAt = µA∗t = mA∗t + bA∗t , so this becomes
gt = α
mA∗t + bA∗t −
³
R∗t bA∗t +Rm∗t mA∗t
µA∗t
´
µA∗t−1
n

= α
·µ
mA∗t −
Rm∗t mA∗t
n
¶
+
µ
bA∗t −
R∗t bA∗t
n
¶¸
which is the government budget constraint for dates t ≥ 2 in the equilibrium.with bonds.
In the monetary equilibrium with no bonds, at date 1, the consumption of the initial old
is ec21 = ω21 − eτ21 + ep1h0
the government budget constraint is
gt = α emA1 − ep1h0n + eτ21n .
30
We have seen that emA1 = mA∗t + bA∗t . Suppose we choose ep1 = p∗1 and eτ21 = τ∗21. Then we
have bc21 = c∗21. In addition, we have
gt = α
¡
mA∗t + b
A∗
t
¢− p∗1 h0
n
+
τ∗21
n
,
which is the government budget constraint in the equilibrium with bonds. ¤
Proof of Corollary 2: In the monetary equilibrium, suppose the government issues cur-
rency in nominal quantities that produce currency return rates bRmt satisfying
(1− bλt)R∗t + bλt bRmt = Rs∗t .
Then if bRt = R∗t , the two-period-lived households of both varieties will face the same interest
rates as in the social security equilibrium and will make the same consumption and saving
choices. Since Rs∗t < R∗t , we must have bRmt < R∗t , so the reserve requirement will be binding
at each date. Note that since bλt = γ∗t , we must have bRmt = n (1− z∗t+1).
In the monetary equilibrium, the credit market clearing condition is
α
³
ωA1t − bcA1t − bmAt − bkt´ = (1− α) ¡ωB1t − bcB1t¢
which can be rewritten
α
³bsAt − bmAt − bkAt ´ = (1− α) bsBt .
We have bmAt = bλt bsAt . Since bλt = γ∗t and bsAt = sA∗t , we have bsAt −bmAt = α³(1− γ∗t ) sA∗t − bkAt ´ =
(1−α) bsBt . We also have bsBt = sB∗t . So if bkAt = kA∗t , which will satisfy the Type A households
Þrst period budget constraint, then we have
α
¡
(1− γ∗t ) sA∗t − kA∗t
¢
= (1− α) sB∗t ,
which is the credit market clearing condition in the social security equilibrium.
In the monetary equilibrium, the government budget constraint is
g = α
Ãbmt − bRmt−1
n
bmt−1! .
This becomes
g = α
Ã
γ∗t s
A∗
t −
bRmt−1
n
γ∗t−1s
A∗
t−1
!
.
We know that after-tax social security beneÞts are Ψ2t = (1−z∗t )n γ∗t sA∗t , and, given bλt = γ∗t ,
it follows from the from the return-rate equality condition that
bRmt = Ψ∗2tΨ∗1,t−1 = (1− z
∗
t )n γ
∗
t s
A∗
t
γ∗t−1sA∗t−1
.
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It follows that
g = α
¡
γ∗t s
A∗
t − (1− z∗t ) γ∗t sA∗t
¢
= α z∗t
¡
γ∗t s
A∗
t
¢
,
which is the government budget constraint (net of pre-tax social security) in the social security
equilibrium.
In the monetary equilibrium, at date 1, the consumption of the initial old households is
bc21 = ω21 + bp1h0
and the government budget constraint is
g1 = α bmA1 − bp1h0n .
We have seen that bmA1 = bλ1 bsA1 = γ∗1 sA∗1 = ΨA∗11 , and we know that Φ∗21 = −αnΨA∗11 and
ΨA∗21 = (1− z∗1)Φ∗21. Suppose we choose bp1 such that
bp1h0 = −ΨA∗21 .
Then we have bc21 = c∗21. In addition, we have
g1 = αΨ
A∗
11 +
ΨA∗21
n
= −Φ
∗
21
n
+
(1− z∗1)Φ∗21
n
= −z
∗
1 Φ
∗
21
n
,
which is the government budget constraint, at date 1, in the social security equilibrium. ¤
Proof of Theorem 3: In the social security equilibrium, the budget constraints of the
two-period-lived households are
cA1t +
cA2,t+1bRdt =
³
ωA1 − bτA1t´+ ωA2,t+1 − bτA2,t+1bRdt
cB1t +
cB2,t+1bRt = ωB1 + ω
B
2,t+1bRt ,
Suppose bRt = R∗t . We have chosen bϕt+1 so that bRdt ≡ (1 − bϕt+1) bRt = Rd∗t . Thus,
both varieties of household face the same interest rates as in the monetary equilibrium. In
addition, bτA2t = − bRdt bτA1t by hypothesis, so the tax terms drop out of the Þrst constraint, and
both varieties of households face the same budget constraints as in the monetary equilibrium.
It follows that they make the same consumption decisions, that the Variety B households
make the same saving decision, and that the saving of the Variety A households is bsAt =
sA∗t − bτA1t = sA∗t − µA∗t . It follows that if bkAt = kA∗t , which satisÞes the Þrst-period budget
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constraints of the Variety A households, then the credit market clears in the social security
equilibrium.
At dates t ≥ 2, the government budget constraints in the social security equilibrium are
gt = −α bzt bTA2t
n
,
and
0 = bτA1t + bTA2tn + bϕt bRt−1 bsAt−1n .
It follows that
gt = α
"bτA1t + bτA2tn + bϕt bRt−1 bsAt−1n
#
,
where bτA2t = (1− bzt) bTA2t. We have bτA1t = µA∗t and bτA2t = −Rd∗t−1 bτA1t−1 = −Rd∗t−1 µA∗t−1, and we
have seen that bsAt−1 = sA∗t−1 − µA∗t−1. So if bRt−1 = R∗t−1 this constraint becomes
gt = α
"
µA∗t −
Rd∗t−1µA∗t−1
n
+
bϕtR∗t−1 ¡sA∗t−1 − µA∗t−1¢
n
#
.
We know
sA∗t−1 − µA∗t−1 = kA∗t−1,
using credit market clearing constraint from the monetary equilibrium. We have
Rd∗t−1 = (1− bϕt)R∗t−1 ⇔ bϕt = 1− Rd∗t−1R∗t−1 ,
This substitution gives us
g = α
"
µA∗t −
Rd∗t−1 µA∗t−1
n
+
¡
R∗t−1 −Rd∗t−1
¢ ¡
sA∗t−1 − µA∗t−1
¢
n
#
= α
"
µA∗t −
Rd∗t−1 eλt−1 sA∗t−1
n
+
¡
R∗t−1 −Rd∗t−1
¢
(1− eλt−1) sA∗t−1
n
#
,
where eλt ≡ µA∗t−1
sA∗t−1
.
This becomes
g = α
"
µA∗t +
R∗t−1(1− eλt−1) sA∗t−1
n
− R
d∗
t−1 sA∗t−1
n
#
= α
µA∗t +
h
Rd∗t−1 − eλt−1Rµ∗t−1i sA∗t−1
n
− R
d∗
t−1 sA∗t−1
n
 ,
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where
Rµ∗t ≡
R∗t bA∗t +Rm∗t mA∗t
µA∗t
,
and we are using the fact that
Rd∗t = (1− eλt)R∗t + eλtRµ∗t ,
which was established in the proof of Proposition 1. We now have
gt = α
"
µA∗t −
eλt−1Rµ∗t−1 sA∗t−1
n
#
= α
"
µA∗t −
Rµ∗t−1 µ
A∗
t−1
n
#
,
and it was shown in the proof of Proposition 1 that this constraint is equivalent to the consol-
idated (purchases plus transfers) government budget constraint in the monetary equilibrium.
We have bτA2t = −Rd∗t−1 bτA1t−1 = −Rd∗t−1 µA∗t−1, and we have bτ2t = (1− bzt) bT2t , giving us
bT2t = −Rd∗t−1 µA∗t−1
1− bzt .
We also have
gt = −α bzt bTA2t
n
.
So we have
gt = α
bzt
1− bzt R
d∗
t−1 µA∗t−1
n
which is
gt = bzt Ãgt + αRd∗t−1 µA∗t−1
n
!
= bzt Ãα"µA∗t − Rµ∗t−1 µA∗t−1n
#
+ α
Rd∗t−1 µA∗t−1
n
!
= α bzt µA∗t .
So
bzt = gt
αµA∗t
=
µA∗t − R
µ∗
t−1 µ
A∗
t−1
n
µA∗t
= 1− R
µ∗
t−1 µ
A∗
t−1
nµA∗t
.
At date 1, in the social security equilibrium, the initial old households consume
bc21 = ω21 − bτ21
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and the budget constraint of the government is
g1 = −bz1bT21
n
,
where bT21 = −αnbτA11 and bτ21 = (1− z1) bT21. We have seen that bτ11 = µA∗t . We must have
−bτ21 = p∗1h0 − τ∗21
for bc21 = c∗21. Thus we must have have
p∗1h0 − τ∗21 = (1− bz1)αnµA∗t ⇔ bz1 = 1− p∗1h0 − τ∗21αnµA∗t .
This gives us
g1 =
³
1− p∗1h0−τ∗21
αnµA∗t
´
αnµA∗t
n
=
αnµA∗t − p∗1h0 + τ∗21
n
= αµA∗t +
τ∗21
n
− p
∗
1h0
n
,
which is the budget constraint in the monetary equilibrium. ¤
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Appendix B
Example 1
In this economy, n = 1, x = 0 and α = 1/2, with (ωA1 ,ω
A
2 ) = (1, 0), (ω
B
1 ,ω
B
2 ) = (0,
2
3) and
ω2 =
1
3 . The common utility function of the members of generations t ≥ 1 is u(c1, c2) =
log c1 + β log c2 with β = 1. It follows that the household saving functions are sj(Rj) =
ωj1−Tj1
2 −
ωj2−Tj2
2Rj
, j = A,B, with RA = Rs and RB = R. In addition, g = 0.005 and h0 = 1.
We begin with a monetary regime that includes fiat money, reserve requirements, and un-
backed government debt. The central bank chooses a monetary policy that features λ∗t = 0.25
and h∗1 = θ
∗h0 and h∗t+1 = θ
∗ h∗t for all t ≥ 1, with θ∗ = 1.2. There is a stationary monetary
equilibrium under this policy that features R∗ .= 1.17390, Rm∗ .= 0.833333 and Rd∗ .= 1.08876.
The (net) inflation rate is π∗ = 1Rm∗−1
.
= 0.2 and the inflation tax rate is 1−Rm∗n
.
= 0.166667.
Equilibrium asset values are sA∗ = 0.5, sB∗ = −0.283953, mA∗ .= 0.125 and bA∗ .= 0.0910469,
so that µA∗ .= 0.216047. The bonds-currency ratio is bA∗/mA∗ .= 0.728376. The initial price
leve1 is p∗1 = 0.06 and the initial transfer is T∗21 = t∗21 =
bA∗
2
.
= −0.0455235 The equilibrium
consumption allocation is (cA∗1 , cA∗2 )
.
= (0.5, 0.544380), (cB∗1 , cB∗2 )
.
= (0.283953, 0.333333) and
c∗21
.
= 0.438857.
Now we turn to a monetary regime with fiat currency and reserve requirements, but no gov-
ernment debt. We look for a monetary policy that supports the same allocation in equilib-
rium. The new policy features λt = µA∗/sA∗
.
= 0.432094 and h1 = θ h0 and ht+1 = θ ht
for all t ≥ 1, with θ .= 1.02369. There is a stationary monetary equilibrium in which
R = R∗ and Rd = Rd∗. The rate of return on currency is Rm = R
m∗mA∗+R∗bA∗
sA∗
.
= 0.96857,
so that the (net) inflation rate is π = 1
R
m − 1 .= 0.0236914 and the inflation tax rate is
1 − Rmn
.
= 0.0231431. Equilibrium asset values are sA = sA∗, sB = sB∗, mA = µA∗1 , and
b
A
= 0. The initial price level is p1
.
= 0.105523; there is no initial transfer. The equilibrium
consumption allocation is unchanged from the preceding case.
Next, we examine a fiscal regime built around a saving-based PAYG social security system,
and we look for a fiscal policy that supports the same allocation in equilibrium. The govern-
ment chooses a saving tax rate of bγt = λt to finance social security contributions, and a social
security benefits tax rate of bz .= 0.0231431. Note that this benefits tax rate is equal to the
inflation tax rate from the currency-only equilibrium. There is a stationary fiscal equilibrium
in which bR = R∗ and bRd = Rd∗. Equilibrium asset values are bsA = sA∗ and bsB = sB∗,
where bsA is gross of taxes. Social security contributions are bΨA1 = mA = µA∗ and pre-tax
social security benefits are bΦA2 = −bΨA1 . At dates t ≥ 2, after-tax social security benefits arebΨA2 = (1 − bz) bΦA2 = RmmA .= 0.211047. The initial social security benefits payment, after
taxes, is bΨ21 = p1h0; bT21 = bΨ21. The equilibrium consumption allocation is unchanged from
the preceding cases.
Finally, we examine an alternative fiscal regime featuring a lump-sum PAYG social security
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system and a proportional tax on deposit returns. The government chooses a fiscal policy
featuring social security contributions of eτA1 = mA = µA∗ and pre-tax social security benefits
of eTA2 .= −0.240223 and eT21 = eτA12 .= −0.108023. At dates t ≥ 2, the tax rate on social secu-
rity benefits is ez .= 0.020814; at date 1, it is ez1 = bz. Thus, after-tax social security benefits
are eτA2 .= −0.235223 and eT21 = bT21. The government also chooses a deposit-returns tax rate
of eϕ .= 0.0725293. There is a stationary fiscal equilibrium in which eR = R∗ and eRd = Rd∗;
note that eτA2 = eRd eτA1 . Equilibrium asset values are esA = sA∗−eτA1 .= 0.283953 and bsB = sB∗.
The equilibrium consumption allocation is unchanged from the preceding cases.
We continue this example by conducting a monetary policy experiment under the initial
monetary regime and describing the equivalent policy experiments under the three equivalent
regimes. The initial monetary policy experiment is an increase in the money growth rate
from θ∗ = 1.2 to θ∗∗ = 1.3, holding the reserve ratio fixed, so that λ∗∗ = λ∗. There is a sta-
tionary monetary equilibrium under this policy that features R∗∗ .= 1.22953, Rm∗∗ .= 0.769231
and Rd∗∗ .= 1.11445. The (net) inflation rate is π∗∗ = 1Rm∗ − 1
.
= 0.3 and the inflation tax
rate is 1 − Rm∗∗n
.
= 0.230769. Equilibrium asset values are sA∗∗ = sA∗, sB∗1 = −0.271107,
mA∗∗ = mA∗ and bA∗∗ .= 0.103893, so that µA∗∗ .= 0.228893. The bonds-currency ratio is
bA∗∗/mA∗∗ .= 0.831144. Note that this ratio is higher than the initial ratio: we can follow
Wallace (1984) by thinking of this experiment as a policy-induced increase in this ratio — an
open market sale — accompanied by endogenous increases in the money growth and inflation
rates Note also that the new inflation rate is higher than the initial inflation rate, so that this
“policy tightening” causes the inflation rate to rise. The initial price leve1 is p∗∗1 = p∗1 and
the initial transfer is T∗∗21 = tx∗∗21 =
bA∗∗
2
.
= 0.0519465. The equilibrium consumption alloca-
tion is (cA∗∗1 , cA∗∗2 )
.
= (0.5, 0.557226), (cB∗∗1 , cB∗∗2 )
.
= (0.271107, 0.333333) and c∗21
.
= 0.445280.
Now we construct an equivalent policy experiment under the currency-only monetary regime.
The experiment consists of an increase in the reserve ratio from λ = µA∗/sA∗ .= 0.432094 to
λ = µA∗∗/sA∗∗ .= 0.457786, and a decrease in the money growth rate from θ .= 1.02369 to
θ
.
= 1.022321. Again, we can think of the change in the money growth rate as an endogenous
response to a policy-induced increase in the reserve ratio. There is a stationary monetary
equilibrium under this policy that features R = R∗∗ and R
d
= Rd∗∗, but R
m .
= 0.978156. The
(net) inflation rate is π = 1
R
m−1 .= 0.022321 and the inflation tax rate is 1−R
m
n
.
= 0.0218443.
Thus, this equivalent policy tightening move causes the inflation rate to fall rather than rise.
Equilibrium asset values are sA = sA∗∗, sA = sB∗∗, mA = µA∗∗ and bA = 0. The initial price
level is p1
.
= 0.111946; there is no initial transfer. The equilibrium consumption allocation
is unchanged from the preceding case.
In the fiscal regime with saving-based PAYG social security, the equivalent policy experiment
is an increase in the saving tax rate from bγ = λ to bbγ = λ and a decrease in the social security
benefits tax rate from bz .= 0.0231431 to bbz .= 0.0218443. Notice that the new benefits tax rate
is equal to the new inflation tax rate in the currency-only economy. There is a stationary
fiscal equilibrium under this policy that features bbR = R∗∗ and bbRd = Rd∗∗. Social security
contributions are bbΨA1 = mA = µA∗∗ and pre-tax social security benefits are bbΦA2 = −bbΦA1 . At
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dates t ≥ 2, after-tax social security benefits are bbΨA2 = (1 − bbz) bbΦA2 = RmmA .= 0.223893.
The initial social security benefits payment, after taxes, is bbΨ21 = p1h0; bbT21 = bbΨ21. The
equilibrium consumption allocation is unchanged from the preceding cases.
Finally, in the fiscal regime with lump-sum PAYG social security and a deposit-returns tax,
the equivalent policy experiment is an increase in social security contributions from eτA1 =
mA = µA∗ to eeτA1 = mA = µA∗∗, a decrease in the social security benefits tax rate for t ≥ 2
from ez .= 0.020814 to eez .= 0.0192241 and for t = 1 from ez1 = bz to eez1 = bbz, and an increase in
the deposit-returns tax rate from eϕ .= 0.0725293 to eeϕ .= 0.0935922. Pre-tax social security
benefits rise from eTA2 .= −0.240223 to eeTA2 .= −0.260090 and from eT21 = eτA12 .= −0.108023
to eeT 21 = eeτA12 .= −0.111946. After-tax social security benefits are eeτA2 .= −0.255090 andeeT 21 = bbT21. There is a stationary fiscal equilibrium in which eeR = R∗∗ and eeRd = Rd∗∗; note
that eeτA2 = eeRd eeτA1 . Equilibrium asset values are eesA = sA∗∗ − eeτA1 .= 0.271107 and eesB = sB∗∗.
The equilibrium consumption allocation is unchanged from the preceding cases.
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